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Abstract 
This paper presents a novel methodology to calculate thresholds in an early warning signalling framework for 
extracting signals useful to predict the occurrence of banking crises. The conditional moments based 
methodology does not rely on assumptions on an objective function trading off Type I and Type II errors 
and  leads to the identification of zones corresponding to different intensities of the signal. The signalling 
performance of these signalling zones is similar to that of the traditional early warning method based on the 
optimisation of a policymaker’s loss function; our methodology in fact outperforms the latter for a number of 
indicators. The methodology is then extended to allow for country specificities, which leads to a substantial 
improvement of the signalling power. On average, across all indicators, the country-specific signalling zones 
outperform the pooled approach, resulting in a larger average true positive rate and a lower false alarms rate. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis resulted in increased attention for macro-prudential policy to 
maintain financial stability. The translation of the Basel III framework2 into European 
legislation3 provided national authorities with a range of macro-prudential policy 
instruments. A number of countries are in fact already applying such macro-prudential 
policy instruments, such as countercyclical capital buffers, additional capital requirements 
on real estate exposures or caps on loan-to-value or debt service-to-income ratios, to 
dampen systemic risk. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) strongly encourages 
European countries to develop sound macroprudential policy strategies to frame such 
actions, which include the identification of leading indicators and associated thresholds 
signalling excessive developments that may lead to systemic risk.4 
In recent years, policymakers as well as academics focused on the identification of early-
warning indicators signalling excessive developments in credit growth and leverage in the 
run-up to a banking crisis. One of the most common methodologies used to identify early 
warning indicators and obtain thresholds is the signalling approach, as introduced in the 
pioneering study by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). The signalling approach results in the 
computation of a threshold above which an indicator signals the potential occurrence of a 
banking crisis over the relevant prediction horizon. Such signals could be used by macro-
prudential policymakers as an initial trigger for an in depth investigation of systemic risk 
and potential policy actions. 
                                                   
1 Prudential Policy and Financial Stability, National Bank of Belgium. Contact: stijn.ferrari@nbb.be, +32 2 221 
54 11; mara.pirovano@nbb.be, +32 2 221 28 45. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank of Belgium. 
2 Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2011). 
3 The CRD IV Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms, and the CRR Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms. 
4 See ESRB Recommendation of 4 April 2013 on Intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential 
policy (ESRB/2013/01) and ESRB (2014). 
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This paper presents a novel yet intuitive methodology to identify leading indicators and 
associated thresholds signalling excessive developments, with the aim of extracting signals 
useful to predict the occurrence of banking crises. A conditional moments approach is 
proposed, in which for a given prediction horizon, the first moment of the indicator 
observations in pre-crisis periods in crisis countries is compared to the first moment of 
observations consistent with normal times. Accounting for the uncertainty surrounding the 
estimates of cross-country first moments, the methodology provides thresholds that 
determine zones, which correspond to different intensities of the signal issued by the 
indicator for the given prediction horizon. 
This study contributes to the great body of literature that aims at identifying useful early 
warning indicators for the occurrence of banking crises. This strand of research relies 
heavily on the signalling approach, following the seminal study of Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999). Compared to the existing signalling approach, our methodology has several 
advantages. First, the thresholds obtained are not dependent on arbitrary assumptions on, 
for example, the objective function to be optimized for obtaining thresholds (e.g.,  the 
noise to signal ratio or a policymaker’s loss function), but rely only on the empirical 
properties of the indicators for the countries considered. Second, in contrast to the standard 
methodology, our framework leads to identify, for each prediction horizon preceding a 
crisis, zones corresponding to different intensities of the signal issued by an indicator. 
Hence, instead of obtaining a single threshold resulting in a binary outcome of the signal, 
we identify areas that convey information on the intensity of warning released by 
indicators. Third, our methodology can be extended to account for country specificities, 
structural features and state dependencies. As such, the methodology provides more 
flexibility than the traditional early warning approaches, which is important in a world 
where country specificities are still important. 
Using  panel  data  for  15  EU  countries,  we  consider  a  number  of  potential  early  warning  
indicators for banking crises and evaluate the properties of our signalling zones in terms of 
extracting signals for predicting crises while minimizing the issuance of false alarms. In 
particular, a comparison is made to the signalling performance of binary early warning 
thresholds obtained through standard methodologies that obtain thresholds on the basis of 
the optimization of an assumed policymaker’s loss function. In addition, the value added of 
allowing for country specificities in improving signalling ability is explored. 
Our findings are the following. First, we show that different assumptions on the 
specification of the policymaker’s loss function (i.e., varying the relative weight assigned 
to Type 1 and Type 2 errors) may lead to substantial differences in binary early warning 
thresholds  and  their  signalling  performance.  Second,  when  comparing  our  conditional  
moments approach to the binary early warning thresholds based on a policymaker’s loss 
function with equal weight assigned to Type 1 and Type 2 errors, we find that on average, 
the signalling performance of our methodology is more or less similar to that of the 
traditional early warning method. In particular, the conditional moments approach results 
in a slightly lower true positive rate (56 vs. 60 percent) and false positive rate (33 vs. 38 
percent), resulting in an average noise to signal ratio close to 0.60 for both methods. For a 
number of indicators,7 out of 44, the conditional moments framework actually outperforms 
(both at least as large true positive rate and at least as low false alarms rate) the traditional 
early warning method. Third, allowing for country specificities substantially improves 
signalling power of the conditional moments approach. When evaluated at the level of the 
entire  sample  of  15  EU countries,  the  average  true  positive  rate  increases  from 56  to  62  
percent and the false alarms rate drops from 33 to 28 percent. The country-specific 
approach outperforms the pooled approach for 29 out of 44 indicators; the reverse is true in 
only 5 cases. The average noise to signal ratio falls from 60 to 47 percent. When evaluating 
signalling performance at the individual country level, the improvement in terms of 
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average  true  positive  rates  and  false  alarms  rates  shows  the  same  picture.  Similarly,  the  
average noise to signal ratio fell from 58 percent to 51 percent. However, the dominance of 
the country-specific approach seems to be somewhat less strong: the country-specific 
conditional moments approach outperforms the pooled one for 214 out of 646 country-
indicator combinations, whereas the reverse is true in 138 cases. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 an overview is provided of 
the signalling approach in the existing early warning literature. Section 3 outlines our novel 
approach for determining zones corresponding to different intensities of the signal issued 
by an indicator. In Section 4 we present the data and evaluation method used in the 
empirical evaluation of the signalling performance of our methodology in Section 5. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THE SIGNALLING APPROACH IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
 
A great body of literature has been produced aiming at identifying useful early-warning 
indicators (EWIs) for the occurrence of crises. While the pioneering studies focused on 
leading indicators of currency crises in emerging economies (e.g. Frankel and Rose 1996, 
Kaminski et al. 1998 and more recently Crespo Cuaresma and Slacik 2008), later studies 
encompassed developing as well as developed countries and considered a wider spectrum 
of events, including banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1997, Babecky et al. 
2012 and 2013, Drehmann and Juselius 2013, Behn et al. 2013) and busts in asset prices 
(Agnello and Schuknecht 2009, Alessi and Detken 2011, Crespo Cuaresma 2010, 
Gerdesmeier et al. 2012). In recent years, a special attention has been devoted to EWI 
models as starting point for the operationalization of macro-prudential policies, such as 
countercyclical capital buffers (Detken et al., 2014), sectorial capital requirements, limits 
to the loan-to-value, loan-to-income and debt-service to-income ratios (ESRB 2013 and 
Ferrari et al. (forthcoming)). 
 
A number of variables have been identified as useful EWIs of banking crises. First of all, 
indicators related to the supply of credit,  such as the deviation of credit  to GDP from its 
long-run trend (Borio and Lowe, 2002, Babecky et al. 2012, Drehmann and Juselius 2013) 
and credit growth (Repullo and Saurina 2011 and Schularick and Taylor 2012). 
Developments in other macro-financial variables such as GDP growth, interest rates 
(Demirgüç and Detragiache 1997, Babecky et al. 2012), current account balance, banking 
sector profitability and capitalization (Behn et al. 2013) have also been found to influence 
the probability of banking sector distress. Furthermore, studies affirm the importance of 
global development in association with the occurrence of banking crises (Behn et al. 2013), 
as well of variables related to developments in the real estate sector (Borio and Drehmann 
2009, Claessens et al. 2011 among others).  
 
From a statistical standpoint, studies on EWIs primarily rely on signal extraction methods. 
The signalling approach, pioneered by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and extended by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), Alessi and Detken (2011) and Lo Duca and 
Peltonen (2013), focus on issuing signals whenever one (or more) indicators breach a pre-
defined threshold during the relevant prediction horizon. Then, the predictive abilities of 
the models can be evaluated by comparing the signal issued with actual observations.  
 
Once a signal is issued by an indicator, four possible outcomes can occur, classified in 
the so-called “Confusion Matrix” presented in Table 1 here below. A signal is classified as 
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correct if a crisis follows within the relevant horizon (A); if a crisis does not follow, then 
the signal results in a false alarm (B). A non-issued signal (i.e., an indicator or model 
output not breaching a threshold) is correct when a crisis does not follow (D) and it is 
incorrect when a crisis occurs (C). 
 
Table 1: Confusion Matrix 
 Crisis No crisis 
Signal is issued A B 
Signal is not issued C D 
 
On  the  basis  of  the  Confusion  Matrix,  a  number  of  key  ratios  can  be  calculated.  The  
fraction of correctly predicted crises represented by the ratio ቀ ୅
୅ାେ
ቁ is called the true 
positive rate (TPR). Similarly the ratioቀ େ
୅ାେ
ቁ or 1-TPR is denoted as the Type I error rate, 
which represents the fraction of missed crises. The noise or false positive ratio (FPR) 
represents the fraction of false alarms, i.e., signals wrongly issued ቀ ୆
୆ାୈ
ቁ. The FPR is also 
referred to as the Type II error rate.  
 
Signal extraction methodologies can then be distinguished on the basis of the approach 
used to calculate the threshold. On one hand, distribution-based methods define the 
threshold as a percentile of the distribution of the indicator over time and across the 
country sample considered. Objective function-based methods5 obtain the threshold 
optimizing an objective function, which specifies the trade-off between Type I and Type II 
errors. Examples of such objective functions are the noise-to signal ratio (defined as ቀ୘୔ୖ
୊୔ୖ
ቁ) 
or a policymaker’s loss function  L = Ʌ ൬ CA + C൰+ (1 െ Ʌ) ൬ BB + D൰ 
 
where parameter ș represents the policymaker’s relative preference for missing crises 
(Type I error) versus issuing false alarms (Type II error). The optimal threshold can then 
be determined as that minimizing the chosen objective function. Optimal threshold 
identification involves a trade-off between missing crises (Type I error) and issuing false 
alarms  (Type  II  error):  a  lower  threshold  decreases  the  Type  I  error  rate  but  at  the  same 
time increases the Type II error rate. 
 
The signalling approach has been applied in a variety of settings. Non-parametric 
applications involve grid searching for the optimal threshold over the set of possible 
values, determined by the cross-sectional and/or the time series distribution of the 
indicator.6  Univariate  or  multivariate  grid  searches  can  be  performed,  but  the  latter  face  
dimensionality problems. In a multivariate setting, Manasse and Roubini (2009) pioneered 
the  use  of  classification  and  regression  trees  to  predict  financial  crisis,  while  Alessi  and  
Detken (2014) extend this approach to a “random forest” framework. The parametric or 
regression approach, implemented inter alia7 by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) 
                                                   
5 Alessi and Detken (2011) and Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013). 
6 See Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio and Drehmann (2008), Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2011), Alessi and Detken 
(2009), Drehmann and Juselius (2013). Ferrari et al. (forthcoming) provide a comparison between non-parametric and 
parametric approaches. 
7 Cfr Babecky et al. (2012 and 2013) for an application in a Bayesian model averaging framework and Ferrari et al. 
(forthcoming) in the context of real estate-related banking crises. 
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and more recently by Behn et al. (2013), usually involves the regression of a binary 
dependent variable, equal to 1 in the relevant prediction horizon, on a set of explanatory 
variables. The resulting predicted probabilities are then used to assess the early warning 
properties of the model.   
 
The methodology presented in this paper is set within the signal extraction framework and 
relies on a distribution-based setting for the computation of thresholds. In this article, the 
binary signalling approach is extended to a multi-threshold framework allowing for 
different intensities of the signal. While our approach can be applied also in a non-
parametric context (see Ferrari and Pirovano, 2014), here we opt for an econometric 
framework. Contrary to the standard regression approach, the binary variables defining the 
relevant  crisis  and  pre-crisis  samples  are  on  the  right  side  of  the  regression  equation  and  
potential indicators are the dependent variables. While we exploit all information derived 
by the pooled set of time series for our sample of countries, the methodology is easily 
extended to obtain country-specific thresholds, which constitutes an important value added 
of our approach.   
 
3. A CONDITIONAL MOMENTS APPROACH FOR EARLY WARNING 
INDICATORS 
 
3.1. Intuition 
Like the traditional early warning approach, the method of conditional moments relies on 
cross-country information, as this yields a sufficient coverage of crisis events in the 
sample.8 The conditional moments approach then builds on the simple comparison of, for a 
given prediction horizon, the average level of an indicator in pre-crisis periods in crisis 
countries and the average level of the indicator in normal times. In a next step, the method 
then accounts for the dispersion around these average indicator levels both across countries 
and over time in order to determine the bounds of a “danger zone” and a “normal zone”. 
In the remainder of the paper, we consider as the relevant prediction horizon a period of 1 
to 3 years before a banking crisis. This window is situated sufficiently close to historical 
crisis events so that the early warning information contained in the indicators can be 
extracted, while at the same time providing sufficiently timely signals, which leave the 
policy maker sufficient time to take remedial action. 
 
3.1.1. Relevant subsamples for calculation of moments: pre-crisis vs normal 
times 
Observations in a window of 5 to 12 quarters before the onset of a banking crisis in those 
countries that actually experienced a banking crisis are classified as “pre-crisis” 
observations.  
 
The  sample  of  observations  consistent  with  normal  times  consists  of  two  subsamples.  A  
first subsample, denoted as “non-crisis countries”, contains observations for countries that 
did not experience a banking crisis in periods that are marked as “pre-crisis” for countries 
actually experiencing a crisis. The second subsample consistent with normal times consists 
of observations for periods in which no country is in a pre-crisis situation, which we refer 
to as “tranquil periods”. 
 
                                                   
8 In case a sufficient amount of crisis events were available for an individual country, the method could 
obviously also be applied to that individual country. 
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The comparison between the first moment of the “pre-crisis” and the “tranquil periods” 
sample shows whether an indicator assumes, on average, higher levels before an imminent 
banking crisis than in tranquil times. The comparison between the first moment of the 
“pre-crisis” and the “non-crisis countries” subsample shows whether an indicator assumes, 
on average, higher levels before an imminent banking crisis in crisis countries than at the 
same points in time in countries where a banking crisis was not imminent. The latter 
comparison is key to account for potential false alarms. In fact, if an indicator shows, on 
average, a similar behaviour in countries that subsequently experience a crisis and in 
countries that do not, it leads to a signal scarcely informative on the vulnerabilities peculiar 
to  a  run-up  to  a  distress  event.  This  can  result,  for  example,  when countries  are  hit  by  a  
common shock, which brings an indicator to rise above levels considered consistent with 
“tranquil periods”, but that do not necessarily lead to the occurrence of a crisis in the near 
future.  
 
3.1.2. Determining thresholds 
In a next step, the dispersion around the first moments of the three subsamples (“pre-
crisis”, “non-crisis countries” and “tranquil periods”) is accounted for. In particular, 
bootstrapped confidence intervals around the three first moments are obtained. 
These bootstrapped confidence intervals serve as the basis for determining zones which 
indicate the intensity of the signal for a particular time horizon. We consider as the 
“normal zone” those indicator levels below the maximum of the upper confidence bounds 
for “non-crisis countries” and “tranquil periods”. We consider as the “danger zone” those 
indicator levels above the lower confidence bound for the “pre-crisis” sample. Depending 
on whether or not the “normal zone” and the “danger zone” overlap, 4 signalling zones can 
be identified, as summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2: Colour coding of signalling zones 
 
 Not in danger zone In danger zone 
In normal zone Safe 
Danger, but false 
alarms 
Not in normal zone 
Warning, but not 
danger 
Danger 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the above described mapping of bootstrapped confidence bounds 
around the first moments of the three subsamples into the signalling zones. 
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Figure 1: From conditional moments to signalling zones 
 
Signals of different intensity 
Indicator levels in the green zone (i.e., below the lower confidence bound for “pre-crisis” 
and below the maximum of the upper confidence bounds for “non-crisis countries” and 
“tranquil periods”) can be considered as “safe”, as the indicator value is situated in the 
“normal zone” and not in the “danger zone”. When indicators lie in the green zone, no 
signal is issued. 
The  indicator  is  in  the  red  zone  when  its  value  is  above the lower confidence bound for 
“pre-crisis” and above the maximum of the upper confidence bounds for “non-crisis 
countries” and “tranquil periods”. Here, the indicator assumes values consistent with being 
in the “danger zone” and at the same time not in the “normal zone”, leading to the issuance 
of a strong signal.  
Two zones are identified in which an intermediate signal is issued. An indicator is in the 
yellow zone when its level is above the maximum of the upper confidence bounds for 
“non-crisis countries” and “tranquil periods” but still below the lower confidence bound for 
“pre-crisis”. The orange zone corresponds to a situation in which the indicator level is 
above the lower confidence bound for “pre-crisis” and below the maximum of the upper 
confidence bounds for “non-crisis countries” and “tranquil periods”. In the yellow zone, a 
warning is issued as the value of the indicator is no longer in the “normal zone”, but it is 
not in the “danger zone” either. In the orange zone, the indicator is in the “danger zone”, 
but the risk of false alarms is likely to be high, as the indicator value is also still situated in 
the “normal zone”.9  
Policy implications 
                                                   
9 In general, indicators with a yellow instead of an orange zone can be expected to have stronger signalling 
capabilities; when the danger zone is situated above the normal zone, the indicator levels in pre-crisis periods 
are more distinct from those in normal times as compared to when there is overlap between the normal and 
the danger zone. 
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The above framework of signalling zones of different signal intensity differs from the 
binary early warning thresholds (see Section 3.2). In the latter, there are only two states, as 
no signal is issues when the indicator is below the threshold and a signal is issued when the 
indicator is above the threshold. A policymaker can then decide whether or not to act on 
this signal. 
 
In contrast, our approach of intensity zones results in three states: no signal is issued when 
the indicator is in the green zone, an intermediate signal is issued when the indicator is no 
longer in the green zone but not yet in the red zone, and a strong signal results when the 
indicator is in the red zone. While a policymaker is unlikely to act upon an intermediate 
signal, as the false alarms rate is still large, the signal issued at this earlier stage 
nevertheless provides the policymaker with relevant information on developments no 
longer being necessarily safe. When the indicator moves to the red zone, the probability 
that the issued signal is not a false alarm but in fact announcing a potential banking crisis is 
increasing, providing more grounds for the policymaker to act.  
 
Hence, this framework of different signalling zones combines a potentially larger true 
positive rate of no longer being in the green zone with a potentially lower false positive 
rate when moving into the red zone. Therefore, it may improve on signalling performance 
as it incorporates more flexibility than binary threshold methods, in which the trade-off 
between Type 1 and Type 2 errors is to be managed by only one instead of two thresholds. 
 
3.2. Empirical implementation 
In principle, the above methodology can be performed in a non-parametric setting, i.e. by 
simply calculating the means of the three subsamples and obtaining bootstrapped 
confidence intervals around these means.10 
 
A parametric (regression) approach has several important advantages, however. In 
particular,  it  allows  us  to  easily  extend  the  conditional  moments  approach  to  account  for  
country specificities, structural features and state dependencies. Therefore, we implement 
the above described methodology by estimating the following linear regression: 
 
௞ܻ,௧ = ߙଵpre-crisis௞,௧ + ߙଶnon-crisis௞,௧ + ߙଷtranquil௞,௧ + ߝ௞,௧  (1) 
 
where ௞ܻ,௧ is level of the early warning indicator under consideration at time t in country k, 
pre-crisis
௞,௧ non-crisis௞ ,௧ tranquil௞ ,௧ are dummy variables equal to 1 when the observation 
at time t in country k is in the pre-crisis, non-crisis countries or tranquil periods subsample, 
respectively, and zero otherwise, and ߝ௞,௧ is an error term. 
 
The (pooled) conditional moments are obtained as follows: 
 
ܧ ቂ ௞ܻ,௧|pre-crisis௞,௧ = 1ቃ = ߙଵ    
ܧ ቂ ௞ܻ,௧|non-crisis௞ ,௧ = 1ቃ = ߙଶ  (2) 
ܧ ቂ ௞ܻ,௧|tranquil௞ ,௧ = 1ቃ = ߙଷ    
 
                                                   
10 Cfr. Ferrari and Pirovano (2014) for an implementation of the methodology in a non-parametric 
framework. 
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Bootstrapped confidence intervals on ߙଵ, ߙଶ and ߙଷ are then obtained by running 
regression (1) on 1,000 bootstrapped data samples, resulting in thresholds for the normal 
and danger zone. 
 
The method is easily extended to account for country specificities by adding country-
specific constant terms as well as other control variables. The simple extension of allowing 
for country specificities amounts to the following regression: 
 
௞ܻ,௧ = ߙଵpre-crisis௞,௧ + ߙଶnon-crisis௞,௧ + ߙଷtranquil௞,௧ + σ ߚ௞country௞௞ + ߝ௞,௧  (3) 
 
where country௞  is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations in country k and zero 
otherwise. 
 
The conditional moments for country k are obtained as follows: 
 
ܧ ቂ ௞ܻ,௧|pre-crisis௞,௧ = 1, country௞ = 1ቃ = ߙଵ + ߚ௞     
ܧ ቂ ௞ܻ,௧|non-crisis௞ ,௧ = 1, country௞ = 1ቃ = ߙଶ+ߚ௞   (4) 
ܧ ቂ ௞ܻ,௧|tranquil௞ ,௧ = 1, country௞ = 1ቃ = ߙଷ+ߚ௞     
 
Bootstrapped confidence intervals on ߙଵ + ߚ௞ , ߙଶ + ߚ௞  and ߙଷ + ߚ௞  are then obtained by 
running regression (1) on 1,000 bootstrapped data samples, resulting in country specific 
thresholds for the normal and danger zone. 
 
A more general model with country specificities, structural features and state dependencies 
amounts to: 
 
௞ܻ,௧ = ቀߙଵ + σ ܺ௞,௧௜௜ ߛ௜pre-crisisቁ pre-crisis௞,௧ + ቀߙଶ + σ ܺ௞,௧௜௜ ߛ௜non-crisisቁnon-crisis௞,௧ +
൫ߙଷ + σ ܺ௞,௧௜௜ ߛ௜tranquil൯tranquil௞ ,௧ + σ ߚ௞country௞௞ + σ ܺ௞,௧௜௜ ߛ௜ + ߝ௞,௧  (5) 
 
where ܺ௞,௧௜  are control variables reflecting the countries’ structural macro-financial 
features. Signalling zones will in this case be time-varying, depending on the evaluation of 
ܺ௞,௧௜  at some point in time within a given country. 
 
4. DATA AND EVALUATION METHOD 
 
4.1. Data 
In terms of country coverage, the database used in this study balances the desire to have as 
broad a sample as possible with both data availability and the increased reliability of 
thresholds when applied to a more homogeneous set of countries. Therefore, the analysis is 
based on 15 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) in the period 1970 to 2014. 
 
4.1.1. Identification of banking crises 
The information on banking crises comes from a database compiled by Babecky et al. 
(2012), which provides quarterly data on the occurrence of banking crises in the EU from 
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1970 to 2012. The dataset is based on information on the timing of banking crises gathered 
from various sources: influential papers, the authors’ own survey and country experts’ 
opinions (mostly from national central banks).11 The database reports crisis periods 
distinguishing whether “at least one source” or “at least two sources” confirmed the 
occurrence of a crisis12. We combine this information considering as banking crises all 
episodes confirmed by at least one source. As for marking the starting date of the identified 
banking crises, we give priority over the starting dates confirmed by at least two sources, 
when these deviate from the starting dates confirmed by at least one source. 
This methodology leads us to identify 26 banking crisis episodes involving each of the 15 
EU countries of our sample, as summarized in Table 3. There are 13 banking crises in the 
context of the recent financial crisis, and 13 banking crises during earlier episodes. 
 
 
Table 3: List of banking crises 
 
country start end country start end 
Austria 2008Q1 2008Q4 Italy 1994Q1 1995Q4 
Belgium 2008Q1 2008Q4 Luxembourg 2008Q1 2008Q4 
Denmark 1987Q1 1992Q4 Netherlands 2008Q1 2008Q4 
 2008Q3 2008Q4 Portugal 2008Q1 2008Q4 
Finland 1991Q1 1995Q4 Spain 1977Q1 1985Q4 
France 1994Q1 1995Q4  2008Q1 2008Q4 
 2008Q1 2008Q4 Sweden 1991Q1 1994Q4 
Germany 1974Q2 1974Q4  2008Q3 2008Q4 
 1977Q1 1979Q4 United Kingdom 1974Q1 1976Q4 
 2008Q1 2008Q4  1984Q1 1984Q4 
Greece 1991Q1 1995Q4  1991Q1 1995Q2 
 2008Q1 2008Q4  2007Q1 2007Q4 
Ireland 1985Q1 1985Q1    
 2008Q1 2008Q4    
Source: Babecky et al. (2012). 
 
 
4.1.2. Potential early warning indicators 
We consider a broad set of macro-financial variables as potential leading indicators of 
banking crises. Data were collected for the aforementioned 15 EU countries from various 
sources, among which the ECB, OECD, BIS and Eurostat databases. The data are at a 
quarterly frequency and range from 1970Q1 to 2014Q2 for the series with the longest 
coverage.  
The  dataset  consists  of  4  categories  of  variables:  credit  variables  (both  structural  and  
cyclical), real estate variables (both price and quantities), interest rates and other 
                                                   
11 The Babecky et al. (2012) database can be freely downloaded at http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/cs/node/372 (March 
2014). 
12 In the papers surveyed by Babecky et al. (2012), banking crises are identified according to a systemic loss 
of bank capital, bank runs or the size of public intervention in the banking sector. The complete database can 
be freely downloaded at: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/cs/node/372.  
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macroeconomic variables.13 Table 4 lists all the variables we consider by category; many 
of these have been found to be useful in predicting banking crises in previous studies.  
 
Table 4: Overview of potential early warning indicators  
credit variables real estate variables other macroeconomic variables 
Total private credit to GDP Nominal residential real estate price 
growth 
Nominal GDP growth 
Household credit to GDP Real residential real estate price growth Real GDP growth 
NFC credit to GDP Price to income ratio Unemployment rate 
Bank credit to GDP Price to rent ratio Inflation  rate 
Non-bank credit to GDP Price to income ratio growth Current account deficit to GDP 
Total private credit to GDP gap Price to rent ratio growth Real effective exchange rate 
Household credit to GDP gap Investment in dwellings to GDP Government debt to GDP 
NFC credit to GDP gap Investment in other buildings to GDP Government debt to GDP growth 
Bank credit to GDP gap Value added construction to GDP Nominal stock market growth 
Non-bank credit to GDP gap interest rates Real stock market growth 
Total private credit growth Nominal government 10y bond yield  
Household credit growth Real government 10y bond yield  
NFC credit growth Nominal 3m money market rate  
Bank credit growth Real 3m money market rate  
Non-bank credit growth Mortgage market rate  
Bank credit share Floating mortgage market rate  
Non-bank credit share Fixed mortgage market rate  
 
Notes: Gaps are calculated as the deviation from the one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with Ȝ=400,000. Price 
to income and price to rent levels are expressed as the percentage deviation of the all-sample average. 
 
4.2. Evaluation method 
For  each  of  the  indicators  in  Table  4,  we  obtain  two thresholds  based  on  the  conditional  
moments approach outlined above as well as the commonly used binary early warning 
threshold derived from the policymaker’s loss function. The policymaker’s loss function 
trades off Type 1 and Type 2 errors and is of the following form: ܮ = ߠ × ܶݕ݌݁1݁ݎݎ݋ݎ+(ͳ െ ߠ) × ܶݕ݌݁2݁ݎݎ݋ݎ, where the Type 1 error is the probability of not issuing a signal 
when a crisis follows, and the Type 2 error is the probability to issue a wrong signal. The 
higher the preference parameter ߠ, the more importance is attached to correctly predicting 
crises (true positive rate or one minus Type 1 error) compared to avoiding false alarms 
(Type 2 error).  
 
We evaluate the signalling power of the signals obtained from our conditional moments 
approach and from binary early warning thresholds. In particular, we consider (in-sample) 
true positive rates, false alarms rates and noise to signal ratios; lower false alarm rates and 
higher true positive rates result in lower noise to signal ratios. 
  
 
 
 
                                                   
13 While it would be very interesting to consider indicators related to credit conditions (e.g., loan to value 
and debt service to income ratios) and the characteristic of the banking sector (e.g., leverage, profitability), 
these data are not available in sufficient time coverage for many countries. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
In this section we present the results of the empirical approach outlined above. In 
particular, we first show the sensitivity of binary early warning thresholds and their 
signalling power for different assumptions on the policymaker’s loss function (different ߠ). 
Next, we compare the signalling power of the signals obtained from our pooled conditional 
moments approach to that from binary early warning thresholds. Finally, we investigate to 
what extent country-specific conditional moments-based signalling zones improve the 
signalling power compared to that of the pooled conditional moments approach. 
 
For reasons of space constraints, we show results for the 5 indicators with the highest 
AUROC14 for  each  of  the  4  indicator  categories  in  Table  4,  as  well  as  aggregate  results  
across all indicators. Detailed results on all individual indicators are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
5.1. Sensitivity of binary early warning thresholds 
The binary early warning thresholds derived from a policymaker’s loss function are not 
only dependent on the empirical properties of the indicators for the countries considered, 
but also on assumptions on the objective function to be optimized for obtaining thresholds. 
Such objective functions could rely on different functional forms on the trade-off between 
Type 1 and Type 2 errors, such as the noise to signal ratio or a policymaker’s loss function. 
 
In the commonly used loss function-based approach, the functional form is determined by 
the value of the preference parameter ߠ. Higher (lower) values of ߠ imply that more (less) 
importance is attached to correctly predicting crises compared to avoiding false alarms, 
thereby resulting in lower (higher) threshold values. Table 5 illustrates how threshold 
values, and consequently signalling power, differ for a range of values of ߠ between 0.3 
and 0.7. 
 
As expected, a low value of the preference parameter (ߠ =0.3) results in low false alarm 
rates (3 percent on average), but generally also in low ability of signalling crises 
(indicating  12  percent  of  pre-crisis  quarters  on  average).  In  contrast,  a  high  value  of  the  
preference parameter (ߠ =0.7) implies good crisis signalling performance (indicating 98 
percent of pre-crisis quarters on average), but also a large false alarms rate (90 percent on 
average). In some cases, higher values of ߠ result in implausibly low threshold values (e.g., 
-3.79 for the total private credit to GDP gap). 
 
 
 
                                                   
14 Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve, see Drehmann and Juselius (2013) and 
references therein. The ROC curve plots the indicator’s TPR against the FPR for every possible value of the 
threshold. The area under the ROC-curve or AUROC ranges from 0 to 1: a value larger than 0.5 indicates 
that an indicator issues informative signals, while for a fully informative indicator the AUROC is 1. The 
AUROC is a robust evaluation criterion, as it assesses the indicator for all possible thresholds. Therefore, it 
does not rely on favourable values of the evaluation metrics for one specific potentially very narrow 
threshold range. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity of binary early warning thresholds  
  ࣂ =0.3   ࣂ =0.5   ࣂ =0.7    
 AUROC threshold TPR FPR threshold TPR FPR threshold TPR FPR #crises 
credit variables            
Household credit to 
GDP gap 
0.71 7.19 0.23 0.07 0.37 0.85 0.48 -0.26 0.94 0.66 21 
Household credit to 
GDP 
0.70 107.89 0.10 0.00 33.31 0.92 0.58 32.82 0.93 0.59 21 
Total private credit 
to GDP gap 
0.65 26.16 0.14 0.02 5.41 0.51 0.28 -3.79 0.95 0.81 24 
Bank credit to GDP 
gap 
0.65 18.40 0.15 0.02 5.86 0.40 0.18 -2.50 0.93 0.78 24 
Bank credit to GDP 0.65 111.68 0.22 0.05 93.31 0.43 0.16 36.79 1.00 0.98 24 
Real estate 
variables 
           
Price to income ratio 0.73 19.96 0.41 0.06 13.81 0.48 0.11 -23.50 0.98 0.83 20 
Price to rent ratio 0.70 16.56 0.50 0.14 10.41 0.57 0.18 -29.92 0.96 0.83 23 
Price to income ratio 
growth 
0.66 8.59 0.33 0.10 7.43 0.39 0.15 -8.60 0.99 0.93 20 
Real residential real 
estate price growth 
0.62 17.47 0.11 0.03 7.82 0.45 0.20 -7.22 0.98 0.92 23 
Nominal residential 
real estate price 
growth 
0.60 32.29 0.06 0.02 10.25 0.53 0.33 -2.81 1.00 0.96 23 
Interest rates            
Nominal 
government 10y 
bond yield (-) 
0.70 4.05 0.60 0.07 4.05 0.60 0.07 15.01 1.00 0.94 19 
Real government 
10y bond yield (-) 
0.68 1.83 0.49 0.16 2.44 0.68 0.27 2.48 0.99 1.00 17 
Fixed mortgage 
market rate (-) 
0.66 2.34 0.01 0.00 4.87 0.72 0.33 6.30 1.00 0.92 11 
Floating mortgage 
market rate (-) 
0.61 1.82 0.00 0.00 4.59 0.82 0.54 5.36 0.98 0.75 12 
Real 3m money 
market rate (-) 
0.59 -3.27 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.53 0.28 11.97 1.00 0.99 13 
Other 
macroeconomic 
variables 
          
Nominal stock 
market growth 
0.64 1.58 0.00 0.00 7.62 0.83 0.53 -5.59 0.95 0.71 20 
Real stock market 
growth 
0.64 1.50 0.00 0.00 4.20 0.88 0.55 -18.44 0.99 0.79 17 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
0.62 114.71 0.00 0.00 98.30 0.97 0.43 98.30 0.97 0.43 13 
Inflation  rate 0.60 13.51 0.00 0.00 1.64 0.84 0.67 1.27 0.96 0.80 17 
Nominal GDP 
growth 
0.59 23.12 0.00 0.00 3.77 0.88 0.69 2.97 0.95 0.79 19 
Average all 
indicators 
0.60 - 0.12 0.03 - 0.60 0.38 - 0.98 0.90 19.34 
Notes: AUROC=Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve, TPR=true positive rate, FPR=false 
positive rate, #crises=the number of crises covered in the data sample available for the indicator. Indicators 
indicated with  (-) have the opposite interpretation: the lower the indicator level, the higher the risk of an 
imminent banking crisis. 
 
 
An intermediate value of the preference parameter (ߠ =0.5), where equal weight is attached 
to  Type  1  and  Type  2  errors,  generally  results  in  intermediate  levels  of  crisis  signalling  
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performance (indicating 60 percent of pre-crisis quarters on average) and false alarm rates 
(0.38 percent on average). Substantial variation exists across indicators, however. Whereas 
some indicators (e.g., household credit to GDP variables, other macroeconomic variables) 
show a high true positive rate in combination with a relative large false positive rate, others 
(e.g., total private credit and bank credit variables, real estate variables) show lower false 
positive rates in combination with relatively low true positive rates. 
 
5.2. Pooled conditional moments approach vs. binary early warning thresholds 
 
Table 6 compares the signalling performance of our pooled conditional moments approach 
given by equations (1) and (2) to that of the binary early warning thresholds with equal 
weight attached to Type 1 and Type 2 errors (ߠ =0.5).  
 
The second and third column (“not green” and “red”) report the thresholds above which the 
indicator value is no longer in the green zone and entering the red zone, respectively. For 
example, a bank credit to GDP gap up to 2.05 is assumed to be safe; for values between 
2.05 and 5.55 an intermediate signal is issued and for values above 5.55 a strong signal is 
issued. For indicators denoted with “-”, the interpretation is the opposite; the lower the 
value of the indicator, the larger the risk of an imminent banking crises. For example, a 
floating mortgage market rate above 4.22 is consistent with the green zone; for rates 
between 3.60 and 4.22 an intermediate signal is issued, and for rates below 3.60 a strong 
signal is issued. 
 
The threshold values determining the signalling zones compare with the binary early 
warning thresholds in the seventh column (threshold). The latter can be situated either in 
the green, red or intermediate signal zones of the conditional moments approach. For 
example, the binary early warning threshold on the household credit to GDP gap (0.37) is 
still in the green zone, which only ends above a level of 1.34. For the total private credit to 
GDP gap, the binary early warning threshold (5.41) is situated in the intermediate signals 
zone: indicators values above 3.74 are no longer in the green zone and the red zone only 
starts above 7.65. Finally, the bank credit to GDP binary early warning threshold (93.31) is 
situated in the red zone, which starts above 83.60. 
 
The conditional moments signalling zone in which the binary early warning threshold is 
situated determines the relative signalling performance of the two approaches. If the binary 
early warning threshold is situated in the green (red) zone, it will have a higher (lower) true 
positive rate but also a higher (lower) false alarms rate, so there will be a trade-off between 
Type 1 and Type 2 errors when comparing the conditional moments framework to the 
binary early warning thresholds. If the latter are situated in the intermediate signals zone, 
this  trade-off  may  still  be  there,  but  cases  where  either  one  of  the  methods  in  fact  
outperforms the other may also exist.  
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Table 6: Pooled conditional moments approach vs. binary early warning thresholds 
 conditional moments ࣂ =0.5  
 notgreen red TPR FPR NTS threshold TPR FPR NTS #crises 
credit variables           
Household credit to GDP gap 1.34 3.07 0.68 0.22 0.32 0.37 0.85 0.48 0.57 21 
Household credit to GDP 47.27 56.28 0.52 0.24 0.46 33.31 0.92 0.58 0.62 21 
Total private credit to GDP 
gap 
3.74 7.65 0.55 0.22 0.40 5.41 0.51 0.28 0.56 24 
Bank credit to GDP gap 2.05 5.55 0.53 0.19 0.36 5.86 0.40 0.18 0.45 24 
Bank credit to GDP 75.38 83.60 0.59 0.25 0.43 93.31 0.43 0.16 0.37 24 
real estate variables           
Price to income ratio -4.60 10.54 0.74 0.14 0.19 13.81 0.48 0.11 0.23 20 
Price to rent ratio -3.96 11.54 0.71 0.18 0.25 10.41 0.57 0.18 0.32 23 
Price to income ratio growth 2.52 4.45 0.61 0.29 0.48 7.43 0.39 0.15 0.38 20 
Real residential real estate 
price growth 
4.31 5.57 0.55 0.32 0.58 7.82 0.45 0.20 0.44 23 
Nominal residential real 
estate price growth 
9.38 10.54 0.57 0.32 0.56 10.25 0.53 0.33 0.61 23 
interest rates           
Nominal government 10y 
bond yield  (-) 
6.64 6.58 0.68 0.51 0.75 4.05 0.60 0.07 0.12 19 
Real government 10y bond 
yield  (-) 
3.35 2.88 0.74 0.37 0.50 2.44 0.68 0.27 0.40 17 
Fixed mortgage market rate  
(-) 
4.81 4.57 0.68 0.24 0.34 4.87 0.72 0.33 0.46 11 
Floating mortgage market 
rate  (-) 
4.22 3.60 0.61 0.27 0.45 4.59 0.82 0.54 0.66 12 
Real 3m money market rate  
(-) 
2.47 2.21 0.70 0.53 0.76 0.90 0.53 0.28 0.54 13 
other macroeconomic 
variables 
         
Nominal stock market growth 16.39 18.65 0.59 0.35 0.60 7.62 0.83 0.53 0.63 20 
Real stock market growth 15.64 15.97 0.56 0.36 0.65 4.20 0.88 0.55 0.62 17 
Real effective exchange rate 99.79 101.20 0.51 0.24 0.46 98.30 0.97 0.43 0.45 13 
Inflation  rate 2.71 3.51 0.46 0.19 0.42 1.64 0.84 0.67 0.79 17 
Nominal GDP growth 6.63 7.36 0.43 0.30 0.68 3.77 0.88 0.69 0.79 19 
average all  indicators - - 0.56 0.33 0.60 - 0.60 0.38 0.59 19.34 
#higher TPR 24 #higher TPR and lower FPR 7 # lower NTS 27  
#lower FPR 27 #lower TPR and higher FPR 0 # indicators 44  
 
Notes: TPR=true positive rate, FPR=false positive rate, NTS=noise to signal ratio, #crises=the number of 
crises covered in the data sample available for the indicator, #higher TPR=number of cases where the pooled 
conditional moments approach has a true positive rate as least as large as that of the binary early warning 
threshold, #lower FPR=number of cases where the pooled conditional moments approach has a false positive 
rate  as  least  as  low as  that  of  the  binary  early  warning threshold,  #higher  TPR and lower  TPR=number  of  
cases where the pooled conditional moments approach has a true positive rate as least as large as that of the 
binary early warning threshold as well as a false positive rate a least as low as that of the binary early 
warning threshold, #lower TPR and higher FPR=number of cases where the pooled conditional moments 
approach has a true positive rate as least as low as that of the binary early warning threshold as well as a false 
positive rate a least as large as that of the binary early warning threshold, #lower NTS=number of cases 
where the pooled conditional moments approach has noise to signal ratio at least as low as that of the binary 
early warning threshold. “Notgreen” indicates the indicator level above which it is no longer in the green 
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zone, “red” indicates the indicator level above which it is in the red zone. Indicators indicated with “-“ have 
the opposite interpretation: the lower the indicator level, the higher the risk of an imminent banking crisis. 
Hence, “notgreen” indicates the indicator level below which it is no longer in the green zone, “red” indicates 
the indicator level below which it is in the red zone. 
 
The bottom two rows of Table 6 provide aggregate statistics comparing the signalling 
performance of the two methods. In 24 (27) out of 44 cases, the conditional moments 
framework has a true (false) positive rate at least as high (low) as the binary early warning 
threshold.  In  27  out  of  44  cases  this  results  in  a  lower  noise  to  signal  ratio  for  the  
conditional moments approach. In 7 out of 44 cases, the conditional moments framework 
actually outperforms the traditional method. This is for example the case for the total 
private sector credit to GDP gap; the conditional moments approach results in a true 
positive rate of 55 percent and a false alarms rate of 22 percent, comparing to 51 and 28 
percent for the binary early warning threshold.  
 
On average, the conditional moments approach results in a slightly lower true positive rate 
(56 vs. 60 percent) and false positive rate (33 vs. 38 percent) than the binary early warning 
thresholds. The average noise to signal ratio is close to 0.60 for both methods. 
 
In terms of indicators performance, the price to income and the price to rent ratio clearly 
outperform  the  other  variables  in  terms  of  noise  to  signal  ratio.  These  indicators  are  
followed by credit variables, mortgage market rate variables15 and the inflation rate. The 
latter correctly classifies less than half of the pre-crisis quarters, however. 
 
5.3. The value added of accounting for country specificities 
 
While signals obtained from the pooled conditional moments approach given by equations 
(1) and (2) may perform reasonably well for a number of indicators at the level of the 
entire sample of 15 EU countries, this may not necessarily be the case for signalling 
performance at the individual country level. In this subsection we therefore assess whether 
a country-specific conditional moments approach, as given by equations (3) and (4) 
improves  signalling  power,  not  only  at  the  level  of  the  entire  sample  of  15  EU countries  
(pooled evaluation), but also at the individual country level. 
 
5.3.1. Pooled evaluation 
Table  7  presents  the  signalling  performance  at  the  level  of  the  entire  sample  of  15  EU  
countries for country-specific conditional moments-based signalling zones based on 
equations (3) and (4). As for the thresholds marking the different zones, the mean, min and 
max across the 15 countries in our sample are shown. With a few exceptions, the average 
thresholds marking the end of the green zone and the start of the red zone are of broadly 
the same order of magnitude as the pooled conditional moments thresholds in Table 6. The 
min and max show that quite some variation may be observed across countries, however. 
For example, whereas for some countries bank credit to GDP levels over 100 percent are 
considered to be safe, bank credit to GDP levels around 70 percent may already mark a 
strong signal in other countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
15 The data sample for mortgage rates only covers crisis episodes from the recent financial crisis, which may 
positively affect signalling performance. 
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Table 7: Country-specific conditional moments approach 
 notgreen red     
 mean min max mean min max TPR FPR NTS #crises 
credit variables           
Household credit to GDP gap 1.09 -2.43 4.93 3.02 -0.12 6.53 0.87 0.19 0.22 21 
Household credit to GDP 50.83 25.22 96.23 55.14 31.28 99.72 0.80 0.20 0.25 21 
Total private credit to GDP 
gap 
3.97 -7.03 12.64 7.70 4.02 14.24 0.64 0.19 0.30 24 
Bank credit to GDP gap 2.50 -1.56 10.75 5.54 1.38 12.15 0.72 0.18 0.24 24 
Bank credit to GDP 76.15 56.74 116.46 80.97 62.25 120.92 0.61 0.20 0.33 24 
real estate variables           
Price to income ratio -2.58 -7.52 7.22 10.52 4.44 19.14 0.70 0.15 0.23 20 
Price to rent ratio -1.79 -9.30 3.89 11.86 4.67 18.97 0.67 0.16 0.60 23 
Price to income ratio growth 2.95 -1.42 6.09 3.70 -0.13 6.10 0.54 0.32 0.58 20 
Real residential real estate 
price growth 
4.37 -0.18 7.37 4.94 0.74 7.95 0.57 0.35 0.62 23 
Nominal residential real 
estate price growth 
9.05 1.76 14.20 9.59 2.54 14.25 0.55 0.33 0.61 23 
interest rates           
Nominal government 10y 
bond yield  (-) 
6.81 5.13 9.16 6.27 4.75 8.46 0.68 0.41 0.60 19 
Real government 10y bond 
yield  (-) 
3.03 1.68 3.98 2.91 1.55 3.86 0.72 0.43 0.60 17 
Fixed mortgage market rate  
(-) 
4.78 3.58 5.72 4.60 3.43 5.46 0.72 0.23 0.32 11 
Floating mortgage market 
rate  (-) 
4.32 3.70 4.95 3.58 2.90 4.37 0.72 0.18 0.25 12 
Real 3m money market rate  
(-) 
2.76 1.03 5.57 1.83 0.27 2.85 0.73 0.46 0.62 13 
other macroeconomic 
variables 
         
Nominal stock market growth 14.61 4.22 19.87 19.82 7.84 31.72 0.65 0.37 0.56 20 
Real stock market growth 11.33 0.81 17.51 19.24 6.62 34.72 0.71 0.35 0.49 17 
Real effective exchange rate 95.74 88.53 107.70 104.36 100.04 112.05 0.86 0.06 0.07 13 
Inflation  rate 2.62 1.57 4.99 3.36 2.09 6.41 0.48 0.20 0.42 17 
Nominal GDP growth 5.91 3.06 9.90 7.90 4.97 12.85 0.57 0.28 0.48 19 
average all  indicators - - - - - - 0.62 0.28 0.47 19.34 
#higher TPR 37 #higher TPR and lower FPR 29 # lower NTS 36   
#lower FPR 37 #lower TPR and higher FPR 5 # indicators 44   
 
Notes: TPR=true positive rate, FPR=false positive rate, NTS=noise to signal ratio, #crises=the number of 
crises covered in the data sample available for the indicator, #higher TPR=number of cases where the 
country-specific conditional moments approach has a true positive rate as least as large as that of the pooled 
approach, #lower FPR=number of cases where the country-specific conditional moments approach has a false 
positive rate as least as low as that of the pooled approach, #higher TPR and lower TPR=number of cases 
where the country-specific conditional moments approach has a true positive rate as least as large as that of 
the pooled approach as well as a false positive rate a least as low as that of the pooled approach, #lower TPR 
and higher FPR=number of cases where the country-specific conditional moments approach has a true 
positive rate as least as low as that of the pooled approach as well as a false positive rate a least as large as 
that of the pooled approach, #lower NTS=number of cases where the country-specific conditional moments 
approach has noise to signal ratio at least as low as that of the pooled approach. Notgreen indicates the 
indicator level above which it is no longer in the green zone, red indicates the indicator level above which it 
is in the red zone. Indicators indicated with  (-) have the opposite interpretation: the lower the indicator level, 
the higher the risk of an imminent banking crisis. Hence, green indicates the indicator level below which it is 
no longer in the green zone, red indicates the indicator level below which it is in the red zone. 
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The average true positive rate amounts to 62 percent and the false alarms rate to 28 
percent. Therefore, the country-specific conditional moments approach on average 
outperforms the pooled approach, which has average true and false positive rates of 56 and 
33 percent, respectively. 37 out of 44 indicators have a true positive rate that is at least as 
high in the country-specific approach as in the pooled approach. The false alarms rate is 
also at least as low for 37 out of 44 indicators. The country-specific approach outperforms 
(both a at least as high true positive rate and a at least as low false positive rate) the pooled 
one in 29 out of 44 cases. This is for example the case for the three cyclical credit variables 
(gaps) in Tables 5 and 6. The country-specific approach is being outperformed by the 
pooled one for 5 indicators. 
 
The average noise to signal ratio is also lower: 47 percent compared to 60 percent. 36 out 
of 44 indicators have a lower noise to signal ratio in the country-specific approach than in 
the pooled approach. 
 
While price to income and price to rent ratios are still among the top performers in terms of 
noise to signal ratio, the ranking of best-performing indicators changes somewhat when 
accounting for country specificities. In particular, non-bank credit growth and the real 
effective exchange rate are now the two indicators with the lowest noise to signal ratio. For 
the remainder, credit variables and mortgage market rates again perform well, as well as 
investment in dwellings, investment in other buildings, and government debt related 
variables (not shown)16. 
 
5.3.2. Country level evaluation 
Table 8 compares the country level signalling performance of the pooled and the country-
specific conditional moments approaches. The thresholds underlying the evaluations are 
given under the headers “notgreen” and “red” in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. For both 
approaches, the average true positive rate and false positive rate across the 15 countries in 
our sample is given, as well as the minimum and the maximum true and false positive rates 
observed across the individual countries. 
 
 
                                                   
16 The latter three again only cover crisis episodes related to the recent financial crisis, however. This is also 
the case for the real effective exchange rate. 
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Table 8: Country level evaluation of pooled vs. country-specific conditional moments approach  
 pooled country-specific  
 TPR   FPR   TPR   FPR   #crises 
 mean min max mean min max mean min max mean min max  
credit variables              
Household credit to GDP 
gap 
0.70 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.45 0.87 0.38 1.00 0.15 0.00 0.38 21 
Household credit to GDP 0.53 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.86 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.01 1.00 21 
Total private credit to 
GDP gap 
0.51 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.01 0.51 0.59 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.05 0.42 24 
Bank credit to GDP gap 0.54 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.00 0.48 0.72 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.00 0.31 24 
Bank credit to GDP 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.70 24 
real estate variables              
Price to income ratio 0.73 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.68 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.00 0.23 20 
Price to rent ratio 0.79 0.50 1.00 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.71 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.00 0.28 23 
Price to income ratio 
growth 
0.55 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.00 0.69 0.51 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.00 0.69 20 
Real residential real 
estate price growth 
0.52 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.00 0.72 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.00 0.52 23 
Nominal residential real 
estate price growth 
0.54 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.00 0.62 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.00 0.45 23 
interest rates              
Nominal government 10y 
bond yield  (-) 
0.73 0.00 1.00 0.53 0.31 0.86 0.73 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.26 0.61 19 
Real government 10y 
bond yield  (-) 
0.78 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.13 0.73 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.14 0.71 17 
Fixed mortgage market 
rate  (-) 
0.71 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.25 1.00 0.21 0.00 0.40 11 
Floating mortgage 
market rate  (-) 
0.56 
0.00 0.88 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.13 1.00 0.21 0.00 0.60 
12 
Real 3m money market 
rate  (-) 0.72 0.00 1.00 0.53 0.18 0.71 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.24 0.61 
13 
other macroeconomic 
variables 
            
Nominal stock market 
growth 
0.64 0.33 0.88 0.35 0.18 0.50 0.70 0.38 1.00 0.36 0.26 0.50 20 
Real stock market growth 0.59 0.19 0.88 0.37 0.16 0.51 0.74 0.50 1.00 0.35 0.28 0.47 17 
Real effective exchange 
rate 
0.51 0.25 0.88 0.23 0.02 0.71 0.86 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.22 13 
Inflation  rate 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.00 0.64 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.06 0.38 17 
Nominal GDP growth 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.00 0.83 0.58 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.16 0.35 19 
average all  indicators 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 19.34 
#higher TPR 507   #higher TPR and lower TPR 214 #country-indicator 
combinations 
646 
#lower FPR 376   #lower TPR and higherTPR 138    
 
Notes: TPR=true positive rate, FPR=false positive rate, NTS=noise to signal ratio, #crises=the number of 
crises covered in the data sample available for the indicator, #higher TPR=number of cases where the 
country-specific conditional moments approach has a true positive rate as least as large as that of the pooled 
approach, #lower FPR=number of cases where the country-specific conditional moments approach has a false 
positive rate as least as low as that of the pooled approach, #higher TPR and lower TPR=number of cases 
where the country-specific conditional moments approach has a true positive rate as least as large as that of 
the pooled approach as well as a false positive rate a least as low as that of the pooled approach, #lower TPR 
and higher FPR=number of cases where the country-specific conditional moments approach has a true 
positive rate as least as low as that of the pooled approach as well as a false positive rate a least as large as 
that of the pooled approach, #lower NTS=number of cases where the country-specific conditional moments 
approach has noise to signal ratio at least as low as that of the pooled approach. Notgreen indicates the 
indicator level above which it is no longer in the green zone, red indicates the indicator level above which it 
is in the red zone. Indicators indicated with  (-) have the opposite interpretation: the lower the indicator level, 
the higher the risk of an imminent banking crisis. Hence, green indicates the indicator level below which it is 
no longer in the green zone, red indicates the indicator level below which it is in the red zone. 
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The average true and false positive rates across countries resulting from the country level 
evaluations in Table 8 are of similar orders of magnitude as the true and false positive rates 
of  the  pooled  evaluations  in  Tables  6  and  7.  At  the  same  time,  the  min  and  max  across  
countries shows that quite some variation exists in both signalling crises and issuing false 
alarms. 
 
When comparing the signalling performance of the pooled conditional moments 
framework to that of the country-specific conditional moments framework, we find that on 
average (across all indicators), the country-specific signalling zones outperform the pooled 
approach; the average true positive rate is larger (62 compared to 56 percent) and the false 
alarms rate is lower (27 compared to 33 percent). When looking at averages across 
countries, this is also the case for all credit variables, the mortgage and money market 
rates, and the other macroeconomic variables. 
 
Shifting to the country level, the country-specific conditional moments approach results in 
a true positive rate that is as least as large as that of the pooled approach in 507 out of 646 
country-indicator combinations. In 376 out of 646 cases the false alarms rate is at least as 
low. Overall, the country-specific approach dominates (at least as large true positive rate 
and at least as low false alarms rate) the pooled one in 214 out of 646 cases. The reverse is 
true in 138 cases.  
 
Hence, while allowing for country specificities improves signalling performance for a 
substantial amount of cases when evaluating performance at the pooled level, there seems 
to be more of a trade-off involving larger true positive rate but also larger false alarms rates 
at  the  individual  country  level.  In  the  majority  of  cases  in  which  a  noise  to  signal  ratio  
could be computed (315 out of 452), this trade-off resulted in a lower noise to signal ratio 
when country specificities where allowed for. The average noise to signal ratio amounted 
to 51 percent in the country-specific conditional moments approach, compared to 58 
percent in the pooled conditional moments approach. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Sound macroprudential policy strategies includes the identification of leading indicators 
and associated thresholds signalling excessive developments that may lead to systemic 
risk. This paper presents a novel yet simple methodology to identify leading indicators and 
associated thresholds, with the aim of extracting signals useful to predict the occurrence of 
banking crises. Our methodology substantially improves on existing ones on three main 
grounds. First, the thresholds obtained are not dependent on arbitrary assumptions on the 
objective function to be optimized, but are based solely on the time and cross-country 
distribution of indicators. Secondly, our methodology results in the identification of 
signalling zones associated with different intensities of the warning issued. This provides 
an additional layer of information to the policymaker, which can be informed of a situation 
no longer consistent with “normal times” and as such worth monitoring closer, and receive 
a stronger signal associated with a lower risk of false alarms when indicators assume levels 
consistent with pre-crisis periods.  Finally, the methodology can easily be extended to 
account for country specificities, structural features and state dependencies, allowing 
exploiting the entire cross-country information in the dataset while obtaining thresholds 
specific to a given country. 
Comparing our conditional moments approach to the binary early warning thresholds 
based on a policymaker’s loss function with equal weight assigned to Type 1 and Type 2 
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errors, we find that on average, the signalling performance of our methodology is more or 
less similar to that of the traditional early warning method. Furthermore, allowing for 
country specificities improves signalling power of the conditional moments approach. 
While this generally holds at the individual country level, in many cases there nevertheless 
seems to be a trade-off involving larger true positive rates but also larger false alarms rates 
at the individual country level.  
Therefore,  we  are  currently  extending  the  analysis  with  the  aim of  further  improving  the  
signalling performance at the level of individual countries, by controlling for structural 
features and state dependencies along the lines suggested in this paper. 
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